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1. INTRODUCING OUR GRANDMOTHERS 
Cheryl Harris begins her canonical piece, Whiteness as Property, by in-
troducing her grandmother Alma. Fair skinned with straight hair and 
aquiline features, Alma "passes" so that she can feed herself and her two 
daughters. Harris speaks of Alma's daily illegal border crossing into this 
land reserved for whites. After a day's work, Alma returns home each 
evening, tired and worn, laying aside her mask and reentering herself.! 
"No longer immediately identifiable as 'Lula's daughter,' Alma could 
enter the white world, albeit on a false passport, not merely passing, but 
trespassing. "2 
In this powerful metaphorical narrative of borders and trespass, of 
masking and unmasking, of leaving home and returning to reenter one-
self, we feel the central truths of Harris's theory. She asserts that white-
ness and property share the premise and conceptual nucleus of a right to 
exclude,3 that the rhetorical move from slave and free to black and white 
was central to the construction of race,4 that property rights include intan-
gible interests,s that their existence is a matter of legal definition, that the 
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tance was provided by Kelsey Inouye. Special thanks to Marl Matsuda for helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this article. 
1. Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1711 (1993). 
2. [d. 
3. [d. at 1736 ("The right to exclude was the central principle, too, of whiteness as 
identity ... [t]he possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude 
others from the privileges inhering whiteness; whiteness became an exclusive club 
whose membership was closely and grudgingly guarded."). 
4. [d. at 1718. 
5. [d. at 1728 ("Modem theories of property reject the assumption that property is 
'objectively definable or identifiable' .... Property in this broader sense encom-
passed jobs, entitlements, occupational licenses, contracts, subsidies, and indeed a 
whole host of intangibles that are the product of labor, time, and creativity, such as 
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law values and protects existing regimes of power and white supremacy, 
and that those regimes are deemed permanent.6 
For many years now, on the first day of class in my seminars on Criti-
cal Race Theory and Race Law and Literature, I have asked my students 
to bring photographs of their maternal grandmothers to class with them. 
The class begins· with students introducing themselves and then their 
grandmothers. I tell my students that I want them to keep their grand-
mothers in the room throughout the semester, to keep them by their sides 
as they read the assigned materials and write their reflection pieces, to 
speak up and give them a voice if, during a class discussion, their grand-
mothers would want to respond to a comment by a classmate or ask a 
question. My initial purpose in this pedagogy was to remind us of the 
wealth of our diversity, to encourage students of color especially, but also 
white students, to bring the stories of their families and communities into 
this discourse on the law.7 Through this exercise, we answer Mari Mat-
suda's call for us to look to the bottom and hear the voices of the ex-
cluded, to learn that listening to these voices is central to critical theory 
and practice.s 
But as I taught Whiteness as Property just two weeks before UCLA's 
Critical Race Studies Symposium, moving it up on my syllabus to help 
me to prepare for the event, I recognized another lesson contained in Har-
ris's story and in my pedagogy. Our grandmothers, like Harris's, are tres-
passers on this white property of intellectual and legal discourse. They 
would cross this border without the appropriate papers of qualification 
and merit, signified by admission to the academy or the bar. The rules 
define them as "unqualified," deem their voices and experience irrele-
vant, deny them identity, status and access. 
If our grandmothers do not belong here, how have we come to be-
long? How have we managed this border crossing? Are we granted ac-
cess because, like Alma, we are no longer identifiable as our people's 
daughters and sons?9 I ask my students to tell me about a time when they 
felt as if they were "passing," whether Harris's grandmother's story of 
making herself invisible feels familiar to them. If the law now forbids the 
"whites only" signs and the formal rules and practices that required Har-
ris's grandmother to pass, why does their experience feel like passing? 
intellectual property, business goodwill, and enhanced earning potential from grad-
uate degrees.") (internal citations omitted). 
6. ld. at 1723-24, 1730. 
7. I first used this exercise in 1996 at a Society of American Law Teachers workshop. 
My talk explored the causes of backlash against affirmative action and the still new 
presence in the academy of persons of color, women and gay and lesbian faculty. I 
asked my colleagues, at the workshop, who were then still a largely straight white 
male group, to introduce their maternal grandmothers. The exercise revealed that 
all of us had left significant parts of our identity and ourselves outside the acad-
emy's gates. See CHARLES LAWRENCE & MARl MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAK-
ING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 225-27 (1997). 
8. See generally Marl Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). 
9. Harris, supra note I, at 1711. 
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Harris teaches that, although the court in Brown v. Board of Education10 
condemned legalized segregation in schools as inherently unequal, and 
rejected the property right of whites in officially sanctioned inequality, it 
"failed to expose the substantive inequality in material terms produced 
by white domination and race segregation."11 De facto white privilege 
remained unaddressed. Brown ratified and reified the status quo of sub-
stantive inequality and sheltered white expectations of race-based privi-
lege. The transition from old to new forms of whiteness as property is 
achieved in this legitimation of substantive inequality and settled expec-
tations of relative white privilege.12 
When people of color come to the academy, a place where inequality 
is institutionalized and rationalized, we trespass on white property. Our 
presence violates settled expectations that the status quo of white privi-
lege will not change.13 But now that the law has abolished formal segre-
gation, fair skin, straight hair and aquiline features are no longer the only 
disguises that allow us to pass. The new narrative that rationalizes the 
property of white privilege claims that race has no meaning. I call this 
story the "Big Lie."14 White supremacy requires this new version of the 
old story because anti-racist movements have achieved significant suc-
cesses in contesting the narrative that justified racial domination by the 
slaver's lash and the colonizer's gun. The master's method has shifted, if 
only in emphasis, from domination to hegemony.15 But the hegemonic 
project must enlist the minds and voices of some of us who are racially 
subordinated. If we think about Harris's metaphor of "passing and tres-
passing," it can help us understand how the new" colorblind post-racial" 
narrative seeks to seduce and enlist us in white supremacy's new hege-
monic project. "Come join us," it calls. No need to look white, although 
10. 347 U.s. 483 (1954). 
11. Harris, supra note 1, at 1752; see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dis-
crimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
12. Harris, supra note 1, at 1731 ("When the law recognizes, either implicitly or explic-
itly, the settled expectations of whites built on the privileges and benefits produced 
by white supremacy, it acknowledges and reinforces a property interest in white-
ness that reproduces Black subordination."). 
13. The virulence and persistence of the backlash against affirmative action are testi-
mony to the strength of those expectations. 
14. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 7, at 67-87. 
15. Critical race theorists have theorized the phenomenon and process of racial forma-
tion or construction and given the name "racial projects" to the discursive and cul-
tural initiatives that contest, organize, and explain the distribution of political and 
material resources along racial lines. See HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDmONs: 
POLmcs, THEORY, COMPARISONS (1994); john a. powell, The "Racing" of American So-
ciety: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & lNEQ. 99 (1997); 
Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 LAW & 
lNEQ. 7 (1997). Race is a social and legal construction-a conceptual mechanism, 
ideology and political device employed to subordinate people of color and to justify 
that subordination. Subordinated communities and anti-racists' popular move-
ments have engaged in projects of racial construction and signification that resist 
and contest racism. However, the racial project that advances the ideology of white 
supremacy dominates this contest and the dehumanizing story this project tells is 
the master narrative. 
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it might help. All you need do to gain access to the new white property is 
to join us in the racial project, in helping us tell the "Big Lie." 
The new whiteness as property no longer marks its borders with Jim 
Crow's "white" and "colored" signs. Instead, structural racism and 
white privilege are legitimated by those signs' absence.16 In the context of 
this "post-racial" project, we must understand the invitation to "pass," 
to differentiate from those other blacks, within contemporary racial for-
mation's theoretical framework. Our racial identity, our presentation of 
self, what some theorists have called "racial performance,"17 either partic-
ipates in white supremacy's master narrative, or contests that narrative. 
When people of color participate in the narrative of colorblindness, we 
"pass." When we say that our race signifies nothing, we support the 
post-racial project that protects and defends white property by denying 
its existence. Moreover, we deny our relationship with our community, 
and we join in the signification of other blacks as less-than-human.18 
II. REPRESENTING THE RACE: My GRANDMOTHER'S WARNING AND A 
LETTER FROM DR. DUBOIS 
Henry Louis Gates calls the autobiographies of Fredrick Douglas and 
the larger body of literature of the black slave "the most obvious site to 
excavate the origins of African American literary tradition."19 
The texts of the slave could only be read as testimony of defile-
ment: the slaves' representation and reversal of the master's attempt 
to transform a human being into a commodity, and the slaves' si-
multaneous verbal witness of the possession of a humanity shared 
in common with Europeans .... The slave wrote not primarily to 
demonstrate humane letters, but to demonstrate his or her own 
membership in the human community.20 
16. See Harris, supra note 1; Freeman, supra note 11; LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 
7; Ian Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 1 (1994); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 
101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (arguing that formal equality actually strengthens and 
reinforces white privilege by declaring that only laws which classify by race on their 
face will be treated as suspect, leaving private, institutional and structural white 
privilege and property in place). 
17. See BELL HOOKS, TALKlNG BACK: THlNKlNG FEMlNIST, THlNKlNG BLACK (1989); TONl 
MORRlSON, PLAYlNG IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1993); 
ROBERT GooDING-WILUAMS, LOOK A NEGRO!: PHILOSOPHlCAL ESSAYS ON RACE, CUL-
TURE, AND POLITICS (2006); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OuR 
CIVlL RIGHTS (2007); HENRy LOUIS GATES, THE SIGNIFYING MoNKEY: A THEORY OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM (1988). 
18. See Charles Lawrence, 'Acting Our Color'; Racial Reconstruction and Identity as Acts of 
Resistance, 18 UCLA AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 21,30 (2013) (relating the story of Law-
rence's great uncle who passed for white, highlighting that " ... when my uncle 
passed and accepted the privileges of whiteness, he was also required to participate 
in the narrative that constructed the family he left behind as Black and inferior."). 
See Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 1145 (2001); ALLYSON HOBBS, A 
HIsTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014). 
19. GATES, supra note 17, at 127. 
20. [d. at 128. 
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From a very early age I remember receiving explicit and implicit les-
sons in the proper practice of racial representation. When my grand-
mother corrected me for slurping my soup or putting my elbows on the 
table, she would ask, "Would you eat like that if the president invited 
you to dinner at the White House?" I knew this question was meant to 
convey more than my grandmother's own high expectations regarding 
table manners. It also contained an admonition about my responsibility 
for racial representation. I must understand that my burden in this re-
sponsibility was significant because white people would expect me (us) to 
be crude and unmannered. I was responsible for demonstrating that we 
were not as white people imagined us. This performance of race, some-
times pejoratively referred to as the politics of respectability, represents 
the race by performing against the narratives of intellectual inferiority, 
laziness, criminality, buffoonery, and savagery that mark us as less 
human, as not fit for citizenship. 
I also learned to represent the race by speaking out against racism, by 
naming it when I saw it, by fighting against the structures that maintain 
white supremacy and the laws and narratives that rationalize and justify 
it. This too was a lesson learned before I had language to speak it. At one 
month of age I received a letter from my father's teacher. "My Dear Sir:" 
it read, "May I congratulate you upon your advent into this astonishing 
world and hope that you may be able to do something toward straighten-
ing it out. Very sincerely yours, W. E. B. DuBois." The letter, framed 
together with a picture of DuBois hangs on the wall above my desk 
today. 
I learned the practice of racial representation as anti-racist politics 
from my parents who broke racial barriers in their professions, who stood 
in vigils, picketed, marched, preached at churches and spoke at confer-
ences, and from their friends and comrades in the struggle who came to 
sit at our dinner table to talk about the "race question."21 I watched them 
live DuBois's instruction to me. 
My sisters and I grew up surrounded by dangerous black men and 
women who taught us two separate but related traditions, racial perform-
ance and racial resistance. Yet, even with the legacy of these wonderful 
teachers, the mastery of this vocation challenges me. How do I perform 
race as respectability and also perform race to name, challenge and dis-
rupt injustice? What feelings do I experience as I negotiate this perform-
ance? When have I remained silent about the anger, fear, and humiliation 
I experienced in the face of racism as well as the longing, joy, pride and 
love that I have known in anti-racist struggle? What silences me? What 
21. In 1955,when I was eleven years old, a young Martin King, Ralph Abernathy and 
Fred Shuttlesworth carne to New York to participate in a non-violence training 
workshop conducted by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a national peace organiza-
tion where my father served as national president. During the training they came to 
our house for dinner. Bayard Rustin, James Farmer, James Lawson, Kenneth Clark, 
and John Hope Franklin were among the civil rights activists who occasionally gath-
ered at our dining room table for a meal and intense political strategizing and 
conversation. 
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violence, laws or social expectations censor our anti-racist speech, and 
what gives us courage to speak out? 
III. "DANGER! EDUCATED BLACK MAN": RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND 
POLITICAL SPEECH 
A. My Nephew's Gift 
In the spring of 2002 I received a package from my nephew Abram 
Wehmiller. I opened it to find two identical black t-shirts. The front of 
the shirts bore an image of a road sign like those that warn drivers of an 
approaching construction site or falling rock zone. The sign read: "DAN-
GER, Educated Black Man." Abe had enclosed a note. "Dear Uncle 
Chuck, I gave one of these shirts to each of the seven black young men in 
my school's graduating class. I thought you should have at least two." 
Abe had been teaching history and coaching basketball at an elite pre-
paratory school in Dallas, Texas for almost four years. One of only a 
handful black teachers at the school, I knew that Abe had supported, 
sheltered, challenged and fed each of these seven young men as they ne-
gotiated the foreign world of this predominantly white school. I smiled 
with pride at the thought of Abe sending these young men out into the 
world with a lesson to wear on their chests, to remind the world and 
themselves that their education had made them dangerous to white 
supremacy and that they should wear that dangerousness with responsi-
bility and pride. I knew that Abe would know that I was also smiling at 
our mutual admiration. He knew I was smiling at his pride in his uncle's 
dangerousness and at what he knew was my pride in him for carrying on 
the family business, a vocation we had both inherited from my father, 
Abram's grandfather. 
Chapter VI of Fredrick Douglass'S 1845 autobiography, Narrative of the 
Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave,22 the definitive story of the 
dangers of black education, opens with a scene of literacy instruction. 
The young Douglass is being taught to read by his mistress, Sophia Auld, 
but his master interrupts the lesson. Hugh Auld warns his wife that it is 
both unlawful and unsafe to teach a slave to read. 
If you give a nigger an inch, he will take an ell. A nigger should 
know nothing but to obey his master-to do as he is told. Learn-
ing would spoil the best nigger in the world ... it would forever 
unfit him to be a slave. He would at once become unmanageable 
and of no value to his master. As to himself, it could do him no 
good, but a great deal of harm. It would make him discontented 
and unhappy.23 
I loved Abe's shirt because it spoke Douglass's discovered truth, a 
truth too often denied by today's narratives of "no child left behind," 
"reverse discrimination," "colorblind constitutions" and "post-racial 
22. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN 
SLAVE (1845). 
23. Id. at 58. 
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worlds." Part of me could not wait to wear it. I wanted to confront my 
colleagues at Georgetown with my blackness and America's racism, to 
make them feel the discomfort that would come with this reminder of our 
shared history of slavery and Jim Crow. 
I kept putting it off. Each time I planned to wear the shirt to work I 
imagined the unease, embarrassment, or anger my shirt might induce in 
my colleagues. One morning I actually put the shirt on and then thought 
better of it and took it off. I feared that many of my colleagues would 
experience the shirt's message as a personal attack. I worried they would 
think, "We welcomed Chuck and befriended him and now, with this 
shirt, he calls us racist." 
I asked myself why I should worry about my colleagues' discomfort 
or annoyance. I was a tenured full professor, secure in my job and rela-
tively secure in my reputation as a scholar and teacher. I had written 
controversial articles and books on the ubiquity of unconscious racism, 
affirmative action and hate speech. I'd spoken out against institutional 
and structural racism in faculty meetings and at protest rallies. Why 
would I hesitate to wear my nephew's wonderful gift? 
I finally wore the shirt to school on a day when I was not scheduled to 
teach. I was acutely aware of peoples' eyes on me and of their expres-
sions as they passed. I am not a self-conscious person. I feel at ease in 
social situations even when I am among strangers and the hallways of 
Georgetown Law Center had been home to me for almost ten years, but 
now I felt newly exposed and vulnerable. 
In the hall on my way to the office, several black students flashed 
knowing smiles and nodded their approval, as did the two black security 
guards at the door. Two white students who were taking a seminar with 
me stopped to read the shirt as I waited for the elevator. They smiled, as 
if to say, "We recognize this genre of Lawrence pedagogy and we want 
you to know that we got the point." Most people in the crowded hall-
ways and elevators passed me by without seeming to notice the shirt, as if 
I were wearing my accustomed shirt and tie. My colleagues were about 
equally divided between those who commented on the shirt and those 
who acted as if they did not notice. Close friends on the faculty stopped 
me to chat about the shirt or came by my office because they'd heard 
about it from a friend. Many asked where I'd found the shirt and I told 
them the story of my nephew's gift to his students and to me. None of 
the people who spoke to me about the shirt seemed offended or put off 
by the shirt's message. The people who knew me best expected nothing 
less from me. But I felt a difference between the responses of my black 
colleagues and even my closest white friends. My black colleagues 
needed to say very little. A knowing look, a resigned sigh, or a brief 
embrace said they knew what it meant and felt like to be a dangerous 
black person. They knew what it felt like for me to wear the shirt. They 
knew I was wearing it for all of us. 
I had anticipated the silence from colleagues who acted as if I did not 
wear a big danger sign on my chest. I knew that by wearing this shirt I 
was breaking a taboo, an implicit agreement that we would not talk about 
racism when we met each other in the halls, certainly not our own racism. 
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They allowed me to say these things out loud in my scholarship, in lec-
tures and even in the classroom, but this was different. They chose not to 
respond to my provocation, not to join this transgression of social eti-
quette. I felt some sympathy, and I must admit some gratitude, for their 
silence. I was relieved that I could avoid the hard conversation my shirt 
invited. 
I had worn the shirt out of a sense of responsibility and obligation. If I 
could not wear this shirt, how could my nephew expect the young men 
he had given the shirt to do so? But now that I'd worn it, I was relieved 
and glad to postpone the conversation with my colleagues, to save it for a 
safer place, to revisit it at another time. 
B. Teaching a Class in Performance Art 
Several years later, Mary Babcock, a young colleague in the art depart-
ment at the University of Hawaii who teaches a class in performance art, 
invited me to come and talk with her students about how I used perform-
ance in my work. When I asked if she could tell me something more 
about what the class might want to hear from me, she responded with a 
question. "What does it mean to you to think about your work as per-
formance?" she asked. Something about Professor Babcock's question 
opened a new lens for me, a new way of thinking about the work I do as a 
lawyer, teacher, activist, parent and critical race scholar. Her question 
encouraged me to think broadly about my work, as vocation, as some-
thing that I was called to do.24 She had asked an artist's question about 
what it meant to represent, convey, or articulate an idea or feeling through 
a particular form or method (performance, rather than drawing, sculpture 
or words). This question about meaning resonated with much of my own 
theoretical work about the meanings we give to the law's narratives and 
the importance of interrogating and revealing unexamined meanings in 
those narratives.25 I knew now that I would talk with her students about 
performing race and how racial performance is central to the politics of 
anti-racism and therefore central to my work. 
On the day I visited Professor Babcock's class I wore my "Danger, 
Educated Black Man" shirt. I stood at the front of the classroom with a 
screen behind me displaying a slide show with a series of visual images-
iconic representations of African Americans as white America has 
imagined us: a drawing of Little Black Sambo; a white minstrel performer 
in blackface; a cartoon caricature of a black uniformed waiter with huge 
distorted lips in a wide smile, the restaurant's name printed on his white 
teeth -"Coon-Chicken Inn;" advertisements for Aunt Jemima Pancakes 
and Rastus Cream of Wheat; a photograph of Flavor Flave---a contempo-
rary minstrel in clownish garb. Interspersed among these images I have 
placed a photograph of myself dressed in a suit and tie, a photograph of 
the Reverend Jeremiah Wright wearing afro-centric vestments and a pho-
24. See Charles R. Lawrence ill, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Strug-
gle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231 (1992); VINCENT HARDING, THERE Is A RIvER (1981). 
25. See Charles R. Lawrence ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) [hereinafter The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection]; Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984). 
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tograph of President Obama as he delivered the State of the Union 
address. 
I tell Professor Babcock's students that I brought the slide show with 
me to make visible the host of characters who join me on the stage each 
time I speak. When I teach a class, give a lecture, write an article, or go to 
a colleague's house for dinner I am always performing race and I always 
perform surrounded by the cast of characters that scrolled behind me on 
the screen. 
In Black Skin, White Masks, Franz Fanon tells the story of his encounter 
with a small white boy and his mother in order to describe the lived expe-
rience of being black in what he calls "pervasively negrophobic 
societies ." 
"Look! A Negro!" It was a passing sting. I attempted a smile. 
"Look! A Negro!" Absolutely. I was beginning to enjoy myself 
"Look! A Negro!" The circle was gradually getting smaller. I was 
really enjoying myself. 
"[Mommal, look, a Negro; I'm scared!" Scared! Scared! Now they 
were beginning to be scared of me. I wanted to kill myself laughing, but 
laughter had become out of the question. 
I couldn't take it any longer, for I already knew there were legends, 
stories, history, and especially historiocity ... 26 
Fanon suggests that these legends, stories, history and the daily "Look, a 
Negro!" encounters impose a "racial epidermal schema," an image of 
Negro bodies foist upon blacks "that ha[s] been superimposed on one's 
body and comes to haunt it like a shadow."27 
When I speak of race as performance, I understand that my perform-
ance must challenge and oppose the stereotypes and racist images that 
white supremacy's narrative projects on my body and encourages me to 
claim as my own. I must be well-spoken, well-dressed, well-mannered, 
serious, supremely competent and non-threatening. I must present my-
self as unlike these images of blackness that surround me. I must remind 
myself that they are not me. Yet, I know the people represented in these 
images are my kin. It will not do for me to say we are not related. 
In a 1987 article titled, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism,28 I argued that the law should acknowledge and 
take cognizance of our ubiquitous and often unconscious racism. I intro-
duced my legal argument with a story from my childhood. I told of my 
feelings of pain, shame and self-loathing as I listened to my teacher read 
the book Little Black Sambo and heard my classmates laugh at its stereo-
typed portrayal of a savage, uncivilized, ignorant, ugly little boy and real-
ized that I was that little boy, that my classmates were laughing at me.29 I 
closed the narrative with a story from my first year at college. 
26. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 91-92 (200S). 
27. GOODING-WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at S. 
2S. Lawrence, supra note 25. 
29. Id. at 317. The prologue to The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection begins with the fol-
lowing description of my experience: 
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A dozen years later I am a student at Haverford College. Again, I am a 
token black presence in a white world. A companion whose face and name 
I can't remember seeks to compliment me by saying, "I don't think of 
you as a Negro." I understand his benign intention and accept the com-
pliment. But the knot is in my stomach again. Once again, I have be-
trayed myself 
This happened to me more than a few times. Each time my interlocutor 
was a good, liberal, white person who intended to express feelings of 
shared humanity. I did not yet understand the racist implications of the 
way in which the feelings were conceptualized. I am certain that my 
white friends did not either. We had not yet grasped the compliment's 
underlying premise: To be thought of as a Negro is to be thought of as 
less than human. We were all victims of our culture's racism.30 
1 first told this story to demonstrate the ubiquity of our infection with 
the ideology and disease of racism and to show how all of us internalize 
white supremacy's narratives and beliefs. My friends' and my own fail-
ure to recognize the racist premise of the "compliment" was evidence of 
our shared unconscious racism, and the universality of our unconscious 
racism was central to my argument in that article,31 
1 tell the story again here because my friend's compliment can also be 
understood as an offer to "pass," to be accepted, as equal and fully 
human by becoming the exception to blackness, to say, "I am not Sambo" 
and to join the narrative that depicts most black folks as less than fully 
human. 
It is circle time in the five-year old group, and the teacher is reading us a book. 
As she reads, she passes the book around the circle so that each of us can see 
the illustrations. The book's title is Little Black Samba. Looking back, I remember 
only one part of the story, one illustration: Little Black Sambo is running 
around a stack of pancakes with a tiger chasing him. He is very black and has a 
minstrel's white mouth. His hair is tied up in many pigtails, each pigtail tied 
with a different color ribbon. I have seen the picture before the book reaches 
my place in the circle. I have heard the teacher read the "comical" text describ-
ing Sambo's plight and have heard the laughter of my classmates. There is a 
knot in the pit of my stomach. I feel panic and shame. I do not have the words 
to articulate my feelings-words like "stereotype" and "stigma" that might 
help cathart the shame and place it outside of me where it began. But I am 
slowly realizing that, as the only black child in the circle, I have some kinship 
with the tragic and ugly hero of this story-that my classmates are laughing at 
me as well as at him. I wish I could laugh along with my friends. I wish I could 
disappear. 
30. [d. at 318. 
31. [d. at 322. Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which 
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experi-
ence, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach signifi-
cance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about 
nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we 
are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not 
recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs 
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other 
words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced 
by unconscious racial motivation. 
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C. Covering: Coerced Assimilation as Censorship 
In his book, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights,32 Profes-
sor Kenji Yoshino, an out gay legal scholar, tells a story from his early 
days at Yale Law School. "When I began teaching a colleague took me 
aside. 'You'll have a better chance at tenure,' he cautioned, 'if you're a 
homosexual professional than if you're a professional homosexual."33 
Yoshino reads this friendly advice as coerced assimilation. He is offered 
full membership in this elite academic club. It's ok with us if you are gay, 
just don't perform gayness, don't confront us with our homophobia or 
make it central to your work. Don't wear your Dangerous Queer Man 
shirt to work. No need to stay in the closet, but you must "cover" that 
shirt. Thus, his title, Covering. 
Yoshino argues that this new generation of discrimination "directs it-
self not against the entire group, but against the subset of the group that 
fails to assimilate to mainstream norms. . .. Outsiders are included, but 
only if we behave like insiders . . . . This covering demand is the civil 
rights issue of our time. It hurts not only our most vulnerable citizens but 
our most valuable commitments."34 
The coercion to behave like insiders that Yoshino speaks of injures us 
by requiring us to hide, deny and participate in the defamation of impor-
tant parts of ourselves, and this surely is a grievous injury. But the cover-
ing demand inflicts another kind of injury on our collective efforts to 
realize a just community. It censors speech that uncovers or "outs" con-
tinuing oppression. This silencing of speech or performance that uncov-
ers our continuing racism or homophobia is especially harmful when the 
dominant narrative calls itself "post-racial" and claims racism no longer 
exists. If we perform race to challenge and reconstruct white supremacy's 
contemporary colorblind narrative, the assimilationist demand to leave 
my shirt at home is more than a restriction on my choice of individual 
identity. It also silences anti-racist speech. 
IV. THE MAUNA KEA MURAL: WHITENESS AS PROPERTY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Last spring in my seminar in Law Race and Literature one of my stu-
dents, Kahikina de Silva, wrote a reflection responding to an article by 
Charles Lawrence entitled Acting Our Color: Racial Re-Construction and 
Identity as Acts of Resistance.35 She wrote: 
Last weekend, a woman I am privileged to call a friend-a Kanaka 
Maoli artist from Maui, who is also a student at UHM-organized 
the painting of a community mural on a section of the plywood 
wall fronting the construction at our own Campus Center. Over a 
hundred students, faculty, parents, keiki, and community mem-
32. YOSHINO, supra note 17. 
33. ld. at 17. 
34. ld. at 22-23. 
35. Charles R. Lawrence III, "Acting Our Color": Racial Re-Construction and Identity as 
Acts of Resistance, 18 UCLA ASIAN P ACIHC L.J. 21 (2013). 
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bers helped recreate the stunning outline of Mauna Kea, and 
populated the painting with our ancestors Papa, Wakea, 
Ho'ohokukalani, and Haloa, and their taro-people descendants. 
Included in the mural was a section covered in blackboard paint, 
with the understanding that the public could participate in the art-
ist's purpose of opening awareness and communication by writing 
comments in response to the work. 
Yesterday, I joined this group of kanaka-which had already 
grown well past the 200-person mark-not to paint, but to rally in 
protest of Ka Leo's decision to paint over the blackboard section, 
which had by then included the statement: "UH cannot be a Ha-
waiian place of learning while leading the destruction of our sa-
cred mountain." In response, we chanted, prayed, spoke of free 
speech and the kuleana to hold landowners like UH accountable 
for their actions. We signed a petition demanding a public apol-
ogy and urging Ka Leo to walk with us in creating a University 
truly dedicated to open discussion, even in controversial issues. 
And we put our sidewalk chalk to work, writing messages of 
aloha' aina on the mural, the sidewalks, and the courtyard in front 
of the Ka Leo office. The number and sentiment of those that gath-
ered in opposition to this institutional silencing of an all-too-often 
muffled narrative was truly inspiring, and reminded me of the 
value there is in gathering the tellers of such marginalized stories, 
if for nothing else than to find the reassurance that we are not 
"crazy" and we are not alone,36 
Mari Matsuda and I had also attended this rally, and we too exper-
ienced a joyful excitement and energy as we greeted colleagues, students 
and friends. We had received an email inviting us to attend from two 
Hawaiian colleagues only the night before. We were thrilled to see how 
many people had come on short notice in the middle of a Wednesday 
morning, and we could see how much it meant to the artists, and the 
students who had organized the protest, to see so many of us who were 
not Hawaiian ready to lift our voices in response to their call for support. 
As the mural controversy emerged, people treated it as a free speech 
case. The student artists who painted the mural and the organizers of the 
subsequent demonstration sought my counsel as a constitutional scholar 
and, in response to the protest, the University and Ka Leo, the student 
newspaper, organized a panel to discuss the "rights and responsibilities" 
of free speech on campus. 
In many ways the events that led to the protest had the makings of a 
Constitutional Law professor's dream First Amendment fact pattern. Ka 
Leo, the UH Manoa student newspaper, was sponsoring an arts festivaL 
As part of the festival, they solicited proposals from artists to create 
murals to cover the plywood wall enclosing a construction site at Campus 
Center. Among others, Ka Leo selected the Kanaka artist's proposal for a 
36. Kahikina de Silva, Student reflection piece written for seminar in Race Law and 
Literature (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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community mural about Mauna Kea. On Saturday and Sunday, about 80 
students, faculty and community people helped paint the mural. Several 
students added handwritten messages on the blackboard portion of the 
mural including the following statement: 
JlUH CANNOT BE A HAWAIIAN PLACE OF LEARNING WHILE 
LEADING THE DESECRATION OF MAUNA A WAKEA." 
JlHEY UH, BE ACCOUNTABLE ... " 
JIBE A HAWAIIAN PLACE OF LEARNING!" 
JlSTAND WITH THE PEOPLE!" 
JlSTOP THE DESECRATION!" 
JlSTOP THE THIRTY METER TELESCOPE!" 
A representative from Ka Leo visited the mural on Saturday and 
asked the artists to remove the written messages, claiming that the 
messages had not been approved as part of the original proposal. The 
artists refused to remove the writing. On Monday the artists arrived at 
the site of the mural to find that the entire blackboard section of the mural 
had been painted over with green paint. The words "Ka Leo Arts Fest" 
were painted in large letters over the green paint. 
These events raise several free speech questions that we might ask re-
garding the scope of the First Amendment's protection of the artists' and 
protestors' rights under the United States Constitution.37 However, those 
37. For example, a court considering a First Amendment challenge to the school news-
paper's removal of the messages painted on the blackboard portion of the mural 
might consider the following issues: 1) Is this removal of the written comments 
censorship based on the speech's content? See, e.g., Police Department of the City of 
Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 101-.02 (1972) (holding that regulation of speech 
based on the content or subject matter of speech will be subject to strict scrutiny and 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.). Mosely 
also held that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its con-
tent." Id. at 95. 2) Is the construction site a public or a non-public forum? Or has 
the state only opened this forum in a limited way to certain speech, discriminating 
based on the manner of speech or the status of the speaker and not on the speaker's 
political message? See, e.g., Addedy v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,39 (1966) (holding the 
jail driveway was not a public forum and that the convictions "of student demon-
strators who had entered jail grounds to protest prior arrests and city segregation 
policies and who blocked for vehicular travel a driveway to jail entrance not nor-
mally used by the public and who did not disperse after being warned by sheriff 
did not deprive them of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, press, as-
sembly, or petition."). Id. at 45; see also International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992) (holding that under the First 
Amendment, airport terminals are "nonpublic forums," and therefore restrictions 
on solicitations may be allowed); U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732- 33 (1990) 
(preventing solicitation by political group on Postal Service grounds is permissible 
under the First Amendment); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,838 (1976) (finding that 
there is no constitutional right to make political speeches on military grounds). For 
example, Ka Leo argued that they had approved a proposal that included visual 
images but not words so that the mural did not comply with their agreement with 
the artists. 3) Is the removal of part of the mural's content a case of the government 
choosing not support its own speech rather than the regulation of private speech? 
For example, Ka Leo might argue that the arts festival is not a public forum at all, or 
even the state offering its support or space to a variety of student artists. Rather, the 
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inquiries and the law's responses to them ignore the primary and central 
claims to justice asserted by the Hawaiians and their supporters who 
joined the demonstration. The march and the message of the mural itself 
claimed rights of recognition, respect and sovereignty. As my student 
noted in her reflection piece, 
As a Kanaka Maoli, this artist cannot ignore her kuleana to speak both of 
our cultural and genealogical ties to this I aina, as well as our politicized 
response to finding those ties continually devalued, ignored, or severed 
by the very institutions that claim to be built on the values of our people, 
but instead are built upon our pika and our iwi.38 
First Amendment doctrine ignores these claims, but it does more. It 
silences them by the same method the Framers employed to justify slav-
ery. The law's analysis begins with a premise, an assumption, about the 
justice of existing title in property-including the title to the proposed 
location of the telescope, the title to the property upon which the demon-
strators sought to place their message and the morality of ownership and 
dominion over a living being. 
The mural and the protest contest that premise on at least three levels 
of analysis and definition. First, the mural gives voice to a Native Hawai-
ian Sovereignty claim that invokes international law to demonstrate the 
illegality of the United States' overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i in 
1893 and subsequent unilateral annexation in 1898. The State's assertions 
of the right to build a telescope on the mountain assumes the legality and 
legitimacy of its ownership and of its claim to title in land on the moun-
tain that begins with this illegal act of occupation and possession.39 Sec-
ond, the State University's claim of ownership to the land on which the 
campus and the construction site are built also rests on this claim to title 
based on an illegal overthrow and occupation. Third, the mural also ex-
presses a world view or ontology, a definition of the Native Hawaiian self 
or group, that treats the mountain, Mauna Kea, as an animate, living be-
ing, as "ohana" (family) ancestor and relative. This worldview contests 
arts festival is part of the University's curriculum and they are entitled to regulate 
what is in essence the school's own speech. See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978). Or they might contend that the University has contracted with the 
artists to speak on the state's behalf. If this is government speech, the government 
may choose any message it wants to put on its wall. If, for example, the University 
were contracting to paint a logo on the wall of the Stan Sherriff Stadium, the artist 
could not claim censorship when the University controlled the content of what she 
painted. 
38. de Silva, supra note 36 .. 
39. See JONATHAN OsoRIO, DISMEMBERING LAHUl: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION 
TO 1887 (2002); TOM COFFMAN, Nation Within: The History of the American Occupa-
tion of Hawai'i (2009); DAVID KEANU SAl, UA MAu KE EA SoVEREIGNTY ENDURES: AN 
OvERVIEW OF THE POLmcAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (2011); 
Kanalu Young, Kuleana: Toward a Historiography of Hawaiian National Consciousness, 
1780-2001, 2 HAWAIIAN J. OF L. & POLmcs 1 (2006); HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A 
NATIVE DAUGHTER (1999). 
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the law's imposed definition of the mountain as inanimate property that 
can be owned and possessed.40 
Here, as Cheryl Harris notes in her discussion of the law's treatment 
of the Mashpee Indian identity, "Whiteness as property assumes the form 
of the exclusive right to determine the rules; it asserts that, against a 
framework of racial dominance and unequal power ... [the law] asserts 
fairness "from a property rule, or indeed any other rule, that imposes an 
entirely externally constituted definition of group identity."41 Like the 
Mashpee, the law divests Native Hawaiians of their identity through the 
State's exclusive control over meaning in ways that reinforce group 
oppression.42 
Speaking of the legacy of slavery that separated the drowned from the 
saved when Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, Professor 
Anthony Farley writes, 
The genealogy of any object of property leads back to an original 
accumulation .... The original accumulation, the violent capture 
of peoples and lands that must take place in order for there to be 
property, appears within the legal system as a time out of mind 
.... The Middle Passage and Manifest Destiny, the original ac-
cumulation that provides the owners' initial capital, belong to that 
time out of mind.43 
Ownership divides space into mine or yours or his or hers or theirs 
or ours.44 
Ownership does something else as welL Ownership also makes 
us forget that things were not always this way45 
The Kanaka demonstrators at the mural break the silence imposed by 
a First Amendment premised on the legitimacy of common law title. 
They will not allow us to forget the violent capture of their lands, the 
overthrow, dispossession and accumulation that transformed their ances-
40. See IOKEPA CASUMBAL-SALAZAR, MULTICULTURAL SElTLER COLONIALISM AND INDIGE-
NOUS STRUGGLE IN HAWAr'r: THE POLmcs OF ASTRONOMY ON MAUNA A WAKEA 
(2014) (PhD Dissertation in Political Science, University of Hawai'i at Manoa) (on 
file with author). Salazar argues that the struggle over Mauna Kea is more than a 
struggle for equality, participation, money or recognition but instead is a struggle 
over meaning and its making. "The push for the telescope takes place within the 
broader context of multicultural settler colonialism under U.S. occupation: realized 
through law and rationalized by science .... (T)he mountain is not only sacred 
because, as some suggest, it provides a means by which to advance political inter-
ests, but rather because the mountain is the embodiment of an ancestor in a land-
based onto-genealogical relationship that informs contemporary articulations of 
aloha'aina, anti-colonial work, indigeneity, the natural and the sacred." Id. at vii. 
41. Harris, supra note 1 at 1766. 
42. ld. 
43. Anthony Farley, The Station, in AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE 
THE MEANING OF HURRlCANE KATRINA 151 (David Dante Troutt, ed., 2006). 
44. Id. at 150. 
45. Id. at 151. 
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tor, Mauna Kea, into property that can be owned.46 They engage in open 
and notorious trespass on property defined by whiteness. They talk back 
to the law's time-out-of-mind narrative that tells us things were always 
this way and that keeps us from imagining that things could be different. 
V. "I Too AM HARVARD" PERFORMING RACE IN THE POST-RACIAL 
UNIVERSITY 
II Students See Many Slights as 'Microagressions' II reads the headline of 
a New York Times Article. The article opens, 
II A tone deaf inquiry into an Asian-American's ethnic origin. 
Cringe-inducing praise for how articulate a black student is. An 
unwanted conversation about a Latino's ability to speak English 
without an accent. This is not exactly the language of traditional 
racism but they all reflect the murky terrain of the social justice 
word du jour-"microagressions"- used to describe the subtle 
ways that racial, ethnic, gender and other stereotypes can play out 
painfully in an increasingly diverse culture."47 
After describing a flood of student blogs, digital photo projects, aca-
demic studies and theatre performances that have documented this phe-
nomenon, the article frames its discussion thusly. 
"What is less clear is how much is truly aggressive and how much 
is pretty micro-whether the issues raised are a useful way of 
bringing to light often elusive slights in a world where overt 
prejudice is seldom tolerated, or a new form of hypersensitivity, in 
which casual remarks are blown out of proportion."48 
Among the student theater performances and digital projects The New 
York Times article discusses is a play titled "I, Too, Am Harvard."49 The 
play was written and directed by Kimiko Matsuda-Lawrence, then a 
sophomore at Harvard College. 50 Based on interviews conducted with 60 
of her fellow black students, the playwright first conceived the play to 
give voice to the injury and anger that she and other black students ex-
46. As Harris points out in her discussion of Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 
"[bleyond the immediate outcome of the case lies the deeper problem posed by the 
hierarchy of the rules themselves and the continued retention by white controlled 
institutions of exclusive control over definitions as they pertain to identity and his-
tory of dominated peoples." Harris, supra note I, at 1765---66. In the case of the 
Mauna Kea Telescope, white controlled institutions define property in a way that 
ignores the history of violent overthrow and occupation of a sovereign nation. 
Moreover the law's definition refuses to acknowledge Hawaiian ontology and self-
identity that views Mauna Kea as familial ancestor and spiritual being. 
47. Tanzina Vega, Students See Many Slights as Racial 'Microaggressions', N. Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/us/as-diversity-increases-
slights-get-subtler-but-still-sting.htrnl. 
48. [d. 
49. Kimiko Matsuda-Lawrence, I, Too, Am Harvard (2014) (unpublished script on file 
with author). 
50. In the interest of full disclosure and with considerable parental pride I report that 
Kimiko is the daughter of Mari Matsuda and Charles Lawrence. 
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perienced in the wake of an opinion piece published by a white student in 
the Harvard Crimson. 51 The piece questioned the efficacy and morality of 
affirmative action generally and of Harvard's consideration of race in its 
own admissions process. At one point in the essay its author opined, 
"Helping those with primarily low academic qualifications into primarily 
academic institutions makes as much sense as helping the visually im-
paired become pilots. How would you feel if you were assured before 
going into surgery that your surgeon was the beneficiary of affirmative 
action in medical school?"52 
The article was a direct attack on the legitimacy of black students' 
presence on campus and on their membership in the Harvard commu-
nity. If black students hoped that Harvard would respond to this attack 
by vigorously defending its admissions policy and the unquestionable 
qualifications of its black students, no defense was forthcoming. As the 
playwright conducted her interviews, the theme of marginalization 
emerged again and again. Students' day-to-day encounters told them 
that they were border crossers without documentation. Their stories 
echoed the words of W.E.B. DuBois who attended Harvard 120 years 
before them when he is said to have remarked that he was "in Harvard 
but not of it."53 
To publicize the first performance of the play, the "I, Too, Am 
Harvard" production team produced a multimedia project and posted it 
on the internet.54 In the photos, black students stand holding whiteboard 
signs depicting the racist encounters they have experienced at Harvard.55 
51. Sarah R. Siskind, Affirmative Dissatisfaction: Affirmative Action Does more Harm than 
Good, THE HARv. CRIMSON (Nov, 2, 2012). ("[A]ffirmative action is fundamentally 
flawed because it uses race instead of targeting these groups themselves. Less aca-
demically qualified applicants should be treated as such, unless they come from 
poorer households and therefore do not have access to the same amount of re-
sources as other applicants. However, this would be class-based affirmative action, 
not race-based."). 
52. Id. 
53. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SocIAL WELFARE HISTORY PROJECT, http://www.socialwelfare 
history.com/eras/w-e-b-duboisl (last visited May 20, 2015), archived at http:! I 
perma.cc/52Q6-LRYT. 
54. I, Too, Am Harvard, http://itooamharvard.tumblr.com/, (last visited Dec. 20, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9A4V-T9U3. The online multimedia project introduced 
itself as follows: "A photo campaign highlighting the faces and voices of black stu-
dents at Harvard College. Our voices often go unheard on this campus, our exper-
iences are devalued, our presence is questioned-this project is our way of speaking 
back, of claiming this campus, of standing up to say: We are here. This place is ours. 
We, TOO, are Harvard. The #itooamharvard photo campaign is inspired by I, Too, 
Am Harvard, a play based on interviews with members of the black community 
exploring and affirming our diverse experiences as black students at Harvard Col-
lege. The original play premier[ed] on Friday, March 7th, 2014 at 7 PM in Lowell 
Lecture Hall on the campus of Harvard College." 
55. Id. "Having an opinion does not make me an "Angry Black Woman"; "I don't see 
color ... Does that mean you don't see Me?"; "My name is MONICA not 'my 
NICCA"'; "Don't you wish you were white like the rest of us?"; "NO, I did not 
immigrate to receive HIV I AIDS treatment!"; "You're dressed like you might shoot 
me right now - such a thug"; "You're LUCKY to be black ... so easy to get into 
college!"; "You aren't black on the inside"; "Are you all so fast because you spend 
so much time running from the cops?"; "You don't sound black. You sound smart"; 
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The video and photo blog went viral and received a million and a half 
hits during the first week. A flood of similar performative video protests 
at colleges around the globe followed their lead-including "I, Too, Am 
Oxford," "I, Too, Am Cambridge," "I, Too, Am Capetown" and "I, Too, 
Am Princeton." 
"I, Too, Am Harvard" responds to a narrative that constructs blacks 
as "not of Harvard," as not belonging to this community of the best and 
the brightest. The play, and the students who perform in the play and 
appear in the photo blog, must talk back to the narrative that says they do 
not belong here. They must perform race as bright, articulate, clean, and 
familiar with the intellectual and academic discourse that we identify 
with Harvard. In the play and the video they perform all of these attrib-
utes in their speech, analysis, and references to elite intellectual discourse, 
symbols and signs that signify Harvard. At the same time, they must 
resist and challenge the neo-liberal narrative that denies structural and 
institutional racism. The liberal narrative offers them the opportunity to 
pass/ assimilate-to inhabit the role "not like other black people." The 
narrative invites them to participate in the defamatory construction of 
black folks by treating their excellence as an exception ("I don't think of 
you as black"). This invitation to pass/assimilate/be not-like-most-
blacks requires them to remain silent about the structural and institu-
tional racism that relegates most blacks to conditions of poverty, prison 
and miseducation.56 
The play places the students' articulate brilliance side-by-side with the 
continuing vitality of racists' beliefs about them and their people. This is 
done with scenes and signs that depict encounters with white students on 
campus to show the way those encounters project a racial screen (or 
Fanon's epidural) on their bodies. The scenes also describe their own feel-
ings and performed responses. 
COCKTAIL PARTY: ONE SCENE FROM THE PLAY 
• We had this big cocktail party and one of the old grad's wives was 
there. When I say old, I mean, this guy's wife was like 70. And I was 
in full black-tie attire. While I was pouring myself a glass of cham-
pagne at the bar she came and she took the champagne out of my hand. 
And I was, like, "Excuse me?" And she's said, "Oh, I'm sorry. Was 
"The lack of diversity in this classroom does NOT make me the voice of all black 
people." 
56. Harris, supra note I, at 1750-51. ("In fact, it is unclear what definition of equality 
was articulated by Brown 1, and in this ambiguity, the property interest in whiteness 
continued to reside. Against the backdrop of real inequality, even as the Court 
abandoned the highly formalistic view of equality underpinning Plessy, it remained 
unwilling to embrace any form of substantive equality, unwilling to acknowledge 
any right to equality of resources."). In the years following Brown, affirmative ac-
tion cases have left property in whiteness in place by shaping the nature of what 
affirmative action is meant to accomplish. Cases like Bakke, Grutter, Gratz, and 
Fisher have emphaSized diversity as the primary purpose of affirmative action, fail-
ing to recognize the substantive equality necessary to achieving "real equality." 
This continued subordination is what the "I Too" project exposes. 
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that not for me?" Yup, she thought I was working. She thought I was 
the help, you know. And I don't know-I think I said something like, 
"Would you- do you want a glass of champagne?" And she said 
"Oh, yeah." And I introduced myself and did the whole "Nice to meet 
you thing, blah, blah, blah. /I But honestly it took all of my power not 
to throw up my hands in anger and disgust-and I think it's moments 
like that, that are really, really fucking tiring, you know? I tried to tell 
the other members about that and they would say, "Oh, yeah man, 
that sucks." But it's different, though. It's different to, like, say, "Oh, 
like, that sucks. That's unacceptable." But like, you don't have to deal 
with that on a daily basis.57 
In the post-racial narrative, the clueless white alumni's wife makes a 
mistake. Why take offense? Why not just correct her? The character's 
dilemma: Her gesture communicates her construction of black men as ob-
viously and only suited for service-as intended to serve her. Does he 
ignore this gesture and absorb the injury he feels? Does he politely point 
out her error and allow her to excuse herself by saying I did not realize 
that you were one of us; that you are one of our exceptions to the general 
rule that blacks are only fit for service. This response requires his aban-
donment of his pride for his father or grandfather who might have been 
servants. This choice requires him to remain silent about the structural, 
institutional and ideological racism through which her white privilege 
(and more importantly Harvard's white privilege) is maintained. Or he 
can break that silence and make a scene, expressing his anger and lectur-
ing this genteel white gathering on racism. That would allow his white 
audience to confirm their suspicions about black folks. He doesn't belong 
after all. 
"I, Too, Am Harvard" narrates these encounters with white folks not 
just as "micro-aggressions" -hurtful remarks or slights hurled at black 
students. Rather, the play reveals narratives that construct black students 
as "other." We need to see your ID, find out your SAT scores, hear your 
articulate speech because blacks don't belong here. Of course, if you can 
prove-with your ID, your SAT, your articulateness-that you are not 
like them, then we stand corrected for our mistake. Certainly you can't 
complain for this small mistake, this unintended slight. Once you have 
shown you are not like them, once you have denied your relationship to 
them, we will admit you. You, too, can be Harvard. 
Of course, this offer of admission requires black students' silence, re-
quires that they not speak of the continued ideology, institutions and 
structures that injure their people, that require them to deny their own 
people and participate in their continued oppression. 
Instead of accepting the invitation to pass, the Harvard students in the 
play stand at the back of the stage in Trayvon hoodies as a young black 
woman at the front of the stage sings "Strange Fruit." They say "I too am 
Harvard" and "I too am Trayvon." And through those words I hear, "I 
57. See Matsuda-Lawrence, supra note 49. 
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want to belong to Harvard, but not to a Harvard that participates in ideo-
logical, institutional, and structural racism." 
The play breaks the silence of coerced assimilation. It does more than 
give voice to individual students to tell a story of slights that make them 
feel like outsiders. They refuse to participate in the narrative that asks 
them to deny their relationship with Trayvon and the Black folks who are 
not at Harvard. Instead, "I Too" says I am here to speak for my people to 
"represent" as an advocate and freedom fighter and to demand that 
Harvard confront how its history, privilege, and identity has always had 
black people at its center. "I, Too, Am Harvard" demands full inclusion 
at the center of today's Harvard community and also gestures toward a 
Harvard history where blacks were always present, even centrally lo-
cated, by virtue of their exclusion, subordination and oppression. 58 This 
was Langston Hughes's meaning when he wrote, "I Too Sing America. I 
am the Darker Brother."59 Our enslavement, our oppression, our segrega-
tion, our hands serving you champagne and carrying your bags, our bod-
ies in your prisons and our sons shot down in your streets are the obscene 
secrets at the heart of what it means to be Harvard, and your darker 
brothers and sisters will not be silent about that family history. 
VI. "I CAN'T BREATHE," "BLACK LIVES MATTER": TRESPASSING ON THE 
WHITE PROPERTY OF POST-RACIAL DISCOURSE 
As I write these words, 50,000 people are marching in the streets of 
New York, 25,000 in Washington D.C., and tens of thousands in Los An-
geles, San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta and Detroit. A St. Louis grand jury 
has failed to indict the police officer who killed Michael Brown in Fergu-
son, Missouri. In New York, the policeman who killed Eric Gamer with a 
chokehold will not stand triaL The students at Harvard have moved their 
protests from the theatre and internet to the streets, as have students 
across the nation. Joining high school students, fast food workers, civil 
rights organizations, religious groups, celebrity recording artists and ath-
letes, they march chanting "hands up don't shoot" and "black lives mat-
ter." They stage die-ins blocking traffic and disrupting business as usual 
in Harvard Yard, on the steps of Memorial Church, on Massachusetts Av-
enue, at the Medical School, Kennedy School, Graduate School of Educa-
tion, Law School and Divinity School, even as their compatriots shut 
down Fifth Avenue in New York, the freeway in Oakland and Union Sta-
tion in Washington, D.C. 
58. See Jennifer Schuessler, Dirty Antebellum Secrets in Ivory Towers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2013, at C1 (discussing recent research exploring universities' historical relationship 
with slavery, including Harvard), CRAIG STEVEN WILDER, EBONY AND Ivy: RACE 
SLAVERY AND THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF AMERICA's UNIVERSITIES, (2013). 
59. Langston Hughes, I, Too, Sing America, POETRY FOUNDATION (1994), available at http:/ 
/www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/177020, archived at http://perma.cc/EKK3-
J7FK ("1, too, sing America,! I am the darker brother.! They send me to eat in the 
kitchen/ When company comes,/ But I laugh,/ And eat well/, And grow strong.! 
Tomorrow,! I'll be at the table/ When company comes./ Nobody'll dare/ Say to 
me,! "Eat in the kitchen," / Then.! Besides,! They'll see how beautiful I ami And 
be ashamed-/ I, too, am America."). 
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The banners, signs and t-shirts reading "I can't breathe," Eric Gamer's 
dying words, shout their hurt, rage, sorrow, deep sense of loss and 
shared injury. They speak the words "I can't breathe" to mourn, remem-
ber, honor and speak for Eric Gamer and Michael Brown. "I can't 
breathe," a lamentation for the more than twenty black people killed by 
the police in 2014: for Tamir Rice, Tanisha Brown, Ramarley Graham, 
Vernicia Woodard, Oscar Grant, Sammy Young, Latasha Harlans, Addie 
Mae Collins, Medgar Evers, Martin Luther King, Jr., Emmett Till, and for 
countless sons, daughters, sisters, brothers, mothers and fathers whose 
names we do not know. "I can't breathe," a call for help, a recognition 
that, even within these Ivy-covered walls, we feel our throats and souls 
constricted. "I can't breathe," a battle cry for justice. "I can't breathe," 
an alarm, a warning that racism and injustice is suffocating all of us. 
Just as "I, Too, Am Harvard" expressed more than black students' ob-
jections to campus racial microagressions, their marches and die-ins, their 
t-shirts and hands held high do more than protest police violence. They 
also challenge the post-racial discourse that claims we have overcome our 
nation's racism. They contest the claim that the law's proclamation of for-
mal equality disestablished the structures and institutions that maintain 
racial privilege and abolished property in whiteness. 
In Part III of Whiteness as Property, Cheryl Harris examines two forms 
of racialized privilege-that she names "status property" and "modern 
property."60 She demonstrates how each of these is ratified and legiti-
mized in the texts of two paradigmatic Constitutional cases, the former in 
Plessy v. Ferguson61 and the latter in Brown v. Board of Education.62 After the 
abolition of slavery, the system of legalized segregation conveyed to 
whites a host of societal privileges, including the vote, freedom to travel, 
attend schools, obtain work, and protection from state and private vio-
lence. Whiteness defined the structure of social relations between the in-
dividual and society and became racialized status ratified in law. Harris 
notes that the Plessy Court reaffirmed this status property in whiteness 
even as it denied that segregation conveyed a message of black 
inferiority.63 
Although Brown overturns Plessy's validation of officially-sanctioned 
segregation and status inequality, Harris argues that Brown represents a 
"transition from old to new forms of whiteness as property."64 Brown 
declined to dismantle white privilege or "even to direct that the contin-
ued existence of institutionalized white privilege violated the equal pro-
tection rights of Blacks."65 White status privilege accorded as a legal right 
60. Harris, supra note 1, at 1714. 
61. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
62. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
63. Harris, supra note 1, at 1746-49. In addition to his claim that segregation violated 
the equal protection clause, Plessy argued that the refusal to seat him on the white 
passenger car deprived him of the reputation of being white which had an actual 
pecuniary value. The Court rejected Plessy's claim by finding that Plessy was not 
white, but reaffirmed the status property in whiteness "by acknowledging that 
whites could protect their reputation of being white through suits for damages." 
64. [d. at 1707. 
65. [d. at 1751. 
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by law was rejected, but substantive inequality produced by white domi-
nation and race segregation remained unaddressed. Thus Brown pro-
tected white Americans' continued expectations of race-based privilege.66 
The protests in the streets respond to the most egregious forms of state 
violence against people of color. The murders of Michael Brown and Eric 
Gamer, like lynching, do more than punish without due process. They 
signify the state's contempt for and failure to recognize black humanity. 
The chant "black lives matter" contests this signification even as it cries 
out against unjust and unjustified murder. "Black lives matter" chal-
lenges the continuing legacy of PZessy's ratification of "status property" in 
whiteness. 67 The students contest Brown's protection of white expecta-
tions of race-based privilege as well. For what constitutes an expectation 
of white privilege if not the belief that white lives matter more than black. 
At a deeper level, "1 Can't Breathe" and "Black Lives Matter" articu-
late the everyday violence visited on black communities by the savage 
inequalities of segregated schools,68 by unemployment and an ever in-
creasing wealth gap,69 by our disproportionate numbers in prisons70 and 
66. Id. at 1753. 
67. Brown fails to articulate segregation's impermissible purpose of maintaining white 
supremacy, further maintaining the continuing "status" injury of the racial mean-
ing of defacto segregation. See Lawrence, supra note 24; Charles R. Lawrence Ill, 
Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of "The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection." 40 CONN. L. REv. 931 (2008). 
68. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE (May 15, 2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/re 
search I k-12-ed ucationl integra tion-and -diversity Ibrown-at-60-great-progress-a-
long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf, archived at http:/ I 
perma.cc/64EH-7JDU ("In schools that are 81-100% black & Latino, over three-
quarters of the students are also enrolled in schools where more than 70% of the 
students live in poverty. In fact, half of students in 91-100% black & Latino schools 
are in schools that also have more than 90% low-income students. This means that 
these students face almost total isolation not only from white and Asian students 
but also from middle class peers as well. These figures represent extreme overlaps 
of poverty and racial concentration and help to explain why schools with high con-
centrations of black and Latino students often have fewer educational resources and 
lower student outcomes."); see also THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, SoRTING OuT DEEPEN-
ING CONFUSION ON SEGREGATION TRENDS (2014), available at http:/ I civilrightsproject. 
ucla.edu I research/k -12 -educa tionl integration-and-diversi ty I sorting-out -deepen 
ing-confusion-on-segregation-trends/Segregation-Trends-Dispute-CRP-Research 
ers.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9DP4-4WLS. 
69. Chris Matthews, Wealth and Inequality in America: /t's Worse Than You Think. FOR-
TUNE MAG. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/10/31/inequality-wealth-in-
come-us/. ("[T]he share of total household wealth owned by the top 0.1 percent 
increasing to 22 percent in 2012 from 7 percent in the late 1970s. The top 0.1 percent 
includes 160,000 families with total net assets of more than $20 million in 2012.") 
(internal quotations omitted); see also DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERI-
CAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1998). 
70. See THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMBATING MAss INCARCERATION - THE 
FACTS Gune 17,2011), available at https:/ Iwww.aclu.org/combating-mass-incarcera 
tion-facts-O; Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/ 
criminal-justice-fact-sheet (last visited Jan. 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
EB74-F9AG (noting that African Americans make up roughly 1 million or 2.3 
million incarcerated people, and are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of 
whites. As of 2001, lout of 6 black men have been incarcerated.). See generally 
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our declining numbers in universities and the professions.71 Most black 
children will not die at the hands of the police, but black and brown chil-
dren who attend segregated schools are "more likely to be poor, more 
likely to go to jail, less likely to graduate from high school, to go to col-
lege, or to finish if they go. They are more likely to live in segregated 
neighborhoods as adults. Their children are more likely to attend segre-
gated schools, repeating the cycle."72 
This is the violence inflicted by the "modem property" in whiteness, 
the expectation of white privilege, ratified and legitimized by Brown v. 
Board of Education's failure to recognize and dismantle the substantive ine-
qualities created and maintained by officially sanctioned white 
supremacy and segregation. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have ex-
tended the boundaries of this property in whiteness and built higher 
fences to protect its borders, releasing hundreds of school districts form 
court-ordered desegregation orders73 and using the colorblind rhetoric of 
the anti-affirmative action cases to hold that school districts may not use 
race to voluntarily desegregate their schools.74 The Supreme Court's col-
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MAss INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
71. Nelson D. Schwartz & Michael Cooper, Racial Diversity Efforts Ebb for Elite Careers, 
Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/ 
us/ texas-firm-highIights-struggle-for-black-professionals.html?pagewanted = all; see 
Patricia Cohen, For Recent Black College Graduates, a Tougher Road to Employment, N. 
Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/business/for-re 
cent-black-college-graduates-a-tougher-road-to-employment.html?partner=rss& 
emc = rss&_r =0. 
72. Nikole Hannah-Jones, How School Segregation Divides Ferguson - and the United 
States, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/sunday-
review /why-are-our-schools-still-segregated.html ("The Normandy School district 
[where Michael Brown attended school] is among the poorest and most segregated 
in Missouri. It ranks last overall in academic performance. Its rating on an annual 
state assessment was so dismal that by the time Mr. Brown graduated the district 
had lost its accreditation .... Just five miles down the road from Normandy lies 
Clayton, the wealthy county seat where a grand jury recently deliberated the fate of 
Darren Wilson, the officer who killed Mr. Brown. Success there looks very differ-
ent. The Clayton public schools are predominantly white, with almost no poverty 
of which to speak. The district is regularly ranked in the top 10 percent in the state. 
More than 96 percent of its students graduate. Eighty-four percent head to four-
year universities."). 
73. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (holding courts need not find that district 
have all portions of its desegregation plan complete before declaring it unitary and 
releasing it from supervision); Oklahoma Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 236 (1991) 
(holding that as soon as a school district achieves unitary status it may be released 
from court ordered segregation); see also Daniel S. Levin, Schools Re-segregate After 
Being Freed From Judicial Oversight Stanford Study Shows, in STAN. NEWS (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http:// news.stanford.edu/ news/2012/ december / schools-resegregation-study-12 
0412.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D954-2XJ6 ("[N]early half of the almost 500 
school districts that were under court order to desegregate as of 1990 have been 
released from judicial oversight during the last two decades, resulting in a slow but 
steady re-segregation, as compared with districts where judicial oversight contin-
ues."); Byron Lutz, The End of Court-Ordered Desegregation, 3 AM. ECON. J. ECON. 
POLICY 130, 164 (2011) ("[D]ismissal of a court-ordered desegregation plan produces 
a gradual, moderate increase in racial segregation."). 
74. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). [Hereinafter "PICS"]. 
In PICS, Chief Justice Roberts claims he is invoking the spirit of Brown v. Board of 
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orblind doctrine and the post-racial discourse it fosters ratifies modem 
white property claiming that structures and institutions that exclude, im-
prison and police us erect no borders, no walls that deny access or signify 
status, bestow no property defined by whiteness. 
This discourse invites some to pass, to gain access to the modem prop-
erty of whiteness by putting on our masks,75 by accepting the invitation to 
exceptional status, by denying ourselves. We are offered the opportunity 
to join a master narrative that pretends that race does not matter and that 
racism no longer exists. The young people in the streets reject this offer 
when they chant "black lives matter," when they wear "I can't breathe" 
shirts as they warm up for basketball games,76 and raise their hands in 
solidarity with Michael Brown's dying gesture,77 when they claim Mauna 
Kea as living ancestor and relative against an occupying state's claim of 
ownership,78 when they wear their "Danger" shirts and invite their 
grandmothers to class. They answer Cheryl Harris's call to engage in 
open and notorious trespass on white property and reclaim it as a com-
mons, and I marvel and rejoice at the clarity of their voices and the sight 
of their beauty. 
Education: "the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimi-
nating on the basis of race," although his holding prevents the school district from 
remedying the status quo of a de facto segregated school system where white chil-
dren in white neighborhoods attend the best schools. In PICS, the white plaintiff 
challenging Seattle's desegregation plan argues that her 14th amendment right to 
equal protection has been violated because the school district has considered her 
child's race in order to maintain some modest desegregation in its schools. At bot-
tom this is an argument that the district's desegregation would redistribute privi-
lege (property) from whites that get to go to the best schools under the status quo to 
some black and brown children who would attend those schools instead. In essence 
the Court holds that the plaintiff's settled expectations of the status quo of white 
privilege have been violated, the "modem" whiteness as property right that Har-
ris's analysis identifies in Brown. 
75. See Lawrence, supra note 18; Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras Y Trenzas: Reflexiones 
Un Proyecto De Identidad Y Analisis A TraVt~s De Veinte Arios, 36 fuRV. J. L. & GENDER 
469 (2013). 
76. Dave Zirin, #BlackLivesMatter Takes the Field: A Weekend of Athletes Speaking Out, THE 
NATION (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/192121/blacklivesmatter-
takes-field-weekend-athletes-speaking-out, archived at http://perma.cc/K6UT-
HCFA; see also Dave Zirin, The Power of Political Athletes to Puncture Privilege, THE 
NATION (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/192777 /power-political-
athletes-puncture-privilege, archived at http://perma.cc/G6S6-7REF; Dave Zirin, 
Lesson Learned: High School Hoops Team Disinvited From Tournament Over 'I Can't 
Breathe' Shirts, THE NATION (Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/ 
193881/lesson-Ieamed-high-school-hoops-team-disinvited-toumament-over-i-cant-
breathe-shirts, archived at http://perma.cc/HL45-GWYR. 
77. See R.B. Fallstrom, St. Louis Rams Protest Ferguson Decision with 'Hands Up,' THE HUF-
FINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/30/rarns-
ferguson-hands-up_n_6245294.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FBY2-H3XL. 
78. See Iokepa, supra note 40. 
